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Closing the Entrepreneurial Gap: Liberalizing
Employment Law to Restore French
Competitiveness
By Kelly Hamren*
Abstract: Malaise in the European economy, and particularly in France, is both a
result of dampened entrepreneurial activity and a continuing drag on economic
competitiveness. In France, rather than undertaking much needed structural reform,
the government has relied heavily on tax increases and heightened public spending to
stimulate growth. This Note contends that French reforms should instead focus on
liberalizing French employment law to encourage entrepreneurial activity. Because
entrepreneurship requires innovation and creates new economic opportunities, it is
increasingly viewed as one of the most important means of resuscitating depressed
economies. By its very nature, entrepreneurship capitalizes on the formation of new
ideas and the development of innovative products and services. Statistically, France
has lower levels of entrepreneurial activity than the United States, China, Brazil, and
many other European countries. France’s government institutions and legal
framework play a critical role in contributing to its low levels of start-up activity.
Rigid hiring and firing laws favor employees and do not lend themselves to the type of
quickly changing and shifting workforces needed by start-up businesses. The costs
and legal implications of hiring, firing, and expanding create risks that often seem to
outweigh the rewards for French entrepreneurs. This Note provides an in-depth
overview of the specific policies and practices in French employment law that restrict
growth in France’s entrepreneurial sector. It concludes with a prescriptive analysis
for restructuring the French legal system to help encourage entrepreneurship and
stimulate job creation in the face of declining French competitiveness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When France’s industry minister wrote to an American CEO
proposing the possible sale of a failing French tire plant, the CEO responded,
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“How stupid do you think we are?”1 In a controversial letter, Maurice
Taylor, the CEO of Titan International, expressed derision regarding the
French “so-called” work ethic, writing that “[t]he French workforce gets
paid high wages but works only three hours. They get one hour for breaks
and lunch, talk for three and work for three.”2 Stirring indignation
throughout France, The Economist suggests that the severity of the French
reaction exposed a nerve, because “[f]or every measure of hyperbole and
gratuitous insult in Mr. Taylor’s letter there was also a grain of truth.”3
The grain of truth to this statement is reflected in France’s declining
competitiveness, record high unemployment, and an economy teetering on
the brink of recession.4
This Note explains the French economy’s struggle to remain
competitive by examining the ways in which France’s rigid employment
laws deter entrepreneurial activity, one of the key drivers of economic
growth. Restrictive employment laws are a key contributor to the French
economy’s declining competitiveness because they inhibit entrepreneurial
activity in three important ways. First, rigid hiring and firing procedures
increase the costs of entrepreneurial risk and decrease firm productivity.
Second, complex regulatory requirements triggered by increases in
workforce personnel inhibit firm growth and encourage inefficient
allocations of labor. Third, large social security contributions impose
prohibitive start-up costs for entrepreneurs.
In order to illustrate the harmful impact of rigid employment laws on
France’s economic performance and levels of entrepreneurship, Part II of this
Note begins by addressing the declining competitiveness of the French
economy and providing an overview of France’s entrepreneurial gap. Next,
Part III discusses entrepreneurship more generally, placing particular
emphasis on the role of legal institutions in shaping entrepreneurial activity.
Then, expanding on these theoretical principles, Part IV examines specific
employment laws that stifle French entrepreneurship, thereby stunting
economic growth. Finally, Part V concludes with a prescriptive analysis,
suggesting that French employment laws need to be reformed in order to
close France’s entrepreneurial gap and boost national competitiveness before
the country’s economy continues to deteriorate.

1

Emmanuel Jarry & Catherine Bremer, Titan CEO Scoffs at France’s Work Ethic and Its ‘So-Called
Workers,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/titan-ceofrench-workers_n_2723996.html.
2
Id.
3
Arnaud Montebourg vs. “The Grizz,” ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2013, 3:16 PM), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/charlemagne/2013/02/french-business.
4
Id.
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II. FRANCE’S DECLINING COMPETITIVENESS
France is lagging behind its European neighbors at enacting
substantive reform and is struggling to remain competitive. The following
part provides an overview of France’s economic challenges within the
context of the euro crisis and highlights one of the main sources of the
country’s economic malaise—low levels of entrepreneurship. As France
trails behind other European economies in competitiveness, it also suffers
from an interrelated lack of entrepreneurial activity.
A. Europe’s Financial Crisis and the French Economy
According to a recent report published by the World Economic Forum
(WEF), “[s]ince the beginning of the financial and economic crisis in 2008,
Europe has been in the eye of a storm, facing an intense financial crisis,
decline in economic performance and growing public discontent.”5 In the
wake of the financial crisis of 2008, economic activity in Europe suffered a
sharp decline,6 European governments had to bail out banks, Iceland went
bankrupt,7 and a sovereign debt crisis in the “Eurozone”8 triggered
widespread concern over the potential breakup of the euro.9
The Eurozone debt crisis erupted in late 2009 in reaction to Greece’s
disclosure that the country had previously misreported national deficit
levels.10 The disclosure severely damaged investor confidence, causing
Greek bond spreads to rise to unsustainable levels while also galvanizing
5

BEÑAT BILBAO-OSORIO ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, REBUILDING EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT 27 (2013) [hereinafter EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS], available at http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_RebuildingEuropesCompetitiveness_Report_2013.pdf.
6
According to a report prepared by the European Commission, “[i]n mid-2013 GDP in the EU and
the euro area [was] respectively 2.4% and 3.1% below the pre-crisis levels of early 2008.” EUROPEAN
COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECON. & FIN. AFF., EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST:
AUTUMN 2013 10 (2013) [hereinafter FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee7_en.pdf.
7
Sheyna Steiner, Timeline: Evolution of the European Debt Crisis, YAHOO! FINANCE (Oct. 29, 2012,
3:01 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/timeline-evolution-european-debt-crisis-070133430.html.
8
The term “Eurozone” will be used to refer to the 17 EU member states that use the euro as their
currency, covering: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Slovenia. REBECCA M.
NELSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf.
9
Uncertainty regarding the integrity of the euro peaked at the end of 2011 and the first half of
2012. FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013, supra note 6, at 12–13. See also Stefan Kaiser, Euro Crisis
Reprieve: End to Bailout Programs Signals Recovery, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2013, 11:27 AM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/end-of-bailout-programs-in-spain-and-ireland-signals-eurocrisis-recovery-a-933650.html (“The summer of 2012 was horrific for Europe. The euro zone seemed
on the verge of collapse, investors were reluctant to lend money to debt-burdened countries and interest
on Spanish and Italian bonds breached the psychologically critical 7-percent mark.”).
10
NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
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international concern regarding the debt levels of other Eurozone
countries.11 In the end, five Eurozone governments—including Greece,
followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus—had to borrow money
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Eurozone
governments through the European Central Bank (ECB) to avoid defaulting
on their sovereign debt.12 Today, however, effective crisis management
and economic reforms undertaken by a number of euro-area countries have
helped restore international confidence in the euro and “uncertainty has
receded but remains elevated.”13 As a result of extensive structural
adjustments,14 the countries that suffered the most during the Eurozone
crisis have reduced labor costs,15 increased labor market flexibility,16
boosted their export ratios,17 and made significant progress at correcting
fiscal imbalances by reigning in their deficits.18
Whereas other Eurozone countries have already engaged in extensive
structural reforms to boost economic performance,19 France has struggled
to keep pace.20 Galvanizing considerable international publicity and
provoking the ire of French officials,21 a controversial issue of The
Economist recently ran an attention-grabbing cover that depicted France as
a ticking time bomb with an image of seven French baguettes bound by the
tricolor flag and a lit fuse at the bundle’s center.22 As the Eurozone’s

11

Id.
Steiner, supra note 7.
13
FORECAST: AUTUMN 2013, supra note 6, at 12–13.
14
Among these structural adjustments, in order to promote growth, many Eurozone countries have
engaged in labor market reform, cut pension and welfare entitlements, streamlined administrative
procedures, and deregulated product markets. HOLGER SCHMIEDING & CHRISTIAN SCHULZ, LISBON
COUNCIL, THE 2013 EURO PLUS MONITOR: FROM PAIN TO GAIN 28 (2013), available at
http://www.lisboncouncil.net/publication/publication/101-the-2013-euro-plus-monitor-from-pain-togain-.html.
15
Id. at 12.
16
Id. at 50.
17
Id. at 19.
18
Id. at 21.
19
For example, Southern European countries—such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy—are undertaking
labor market reforms that include (1) aligning collective wage-bargaining with business needs, (2)
introducing more flexible work-time arrangements, and (3) relaxing restrictions on hiring and firing.
EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 12.
20
SCHMIEDING & SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 10 (observing that, as of late 2013, “France remains
the only major European economy which is beset by serious health problems and has not yet done much
about it”); see also William Horobin & Gabriele Parussini, S&P Cuts France’s Credit Rating by One
Notch to Double-A, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052702303309504579184984164551794 (quoting the observation of Frederik Ducrozet, a senior
economist at Crédit Agricole, that “when you look at price competitiveness, there is absolutely no doubt
that France is lagging the structural adjustment that Germany has gone through over the past decade”).
21
Angelique Chrisafis, France Blows up at Economist’s ‘Ticking Time-Bomb’ Cover, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 16, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/16/economist-front-cover-france.
22
The Time-Bomb at the Heart of Europe: Why France Could Become the Biggest Danger to
12
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second-largest economy, France’s failure to undertake meaningful reform
could pose a significant threat to European recovery, which has led the
Lisbon Council, an economic think tank, to describe France as “[t]he sick
man of Europe.”23 French underperformance along a variety of economic
measures highlights the need for economic reform. At its highest level of
joblessness in over fifteen years,24 11% of the French population is
currently unemployed.25 France is also “suffering from a widening
prosperity gap” in terms of per capita GDP.26 In 2010, France placed
eleventh out of a total of fifteen European economies, “ranking higher than
only the Southern European Economies of Spain, Italy, Greece, and
Portugal.”27 The government was forced to raise its estimated 2013 budget
deficit from 3.7% to 4.1% of France’s GDP,28 and real GDP growth was
projected at a mere 0.1% for 2013.29 Analysts also anticipated that fixed
capital investment would contract by 2.5% in 2013.30
B. France’s Competitiveness Challenge
Both in Europe and in France, lagging economic competitiveness is at
the heart of the current financial crisis.
In its annual Global
Competitiveness Report, the WEF defines competitiveness as “the set of
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of
a country.”31 By driving the rates of return that can be obtained for
investments in a particular country’s economy, productivity serves as a
Europe’s Single Currency, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012, at 13 [hereinafter Time-Bomb].
23
Hugh Carnegy, PMI Indicators Raise Worries over French Economy, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014,
2:51 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad21a5c0-739f-11e3-a0c0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qicqqk8q.
According to the Lisbon Council, in contrast to significant reform efforts by the four euro members—
Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal—whose economies fueled the euro’s crisis, “[w]e still find only
very limited progress in France.” SCHMIEDING & SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 3. The European think
tank continued: “The country needs to slash expenditures, cut taxes and go far beyond the minor labour
market reform of early 2013. Otherwise, France could wind up at the very bottom of the European
ranking in as little as three years.” Id.
24
Mark Deen, French Workers Who Talk for 3 Hours Don’t Cut It, Titan Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
20, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/french-workers-who-talk-for-3hours-don-t-cut-it-titan-says.html.
25
EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECON. & FIN. AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC FORECAST: WINTER 2013 1 (2013) [hereinafter FORECAST: WINTER 2013], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee1_en.pdf.
26
ERIC LABAYE ET AL., FRENCH EMPLOYMENT 2020: FIVE PRIORITIES FOR ACTION 14 (2012),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/employment_and_growth/french_employment_2020.
27
Id.
28
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE 4 (Jan. 2014).
29
Id. at 6.
30
Id.
31
WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013: FULL DATA
EDITION 4 (2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013], available at
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013.

524

HAMREN_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/3/14 7:24 PM

Closing the Entrepreneurial Gap
34:519 (2014)

central component of competitiveness and economic growth that “sets the
level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy.”32 The WEF has
based its competitiveness analysis on the Global Competitiveness Index
(GCI) since 2005, which serves as a comprehensive tool for measuring the
microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national productivity
along a variety of categories.33 The GCI is calculated by using the
weighted average of twelve different “pillars of competitiveness,” which
include, among other components of competitiveness, labor market
efficiency and innovation.34 Although all twelve pillars are aggregated into
a single competitiveness index, measures for each of the pillars are also
reported individually to provide “a sense of the specific areas in which a
particular country needs to improve.”35
While France has long been considered one of the Eurozone’s
economic leaders along with Germany,36 the country’s declining
competitiveness has become increasingly pronounced. Not only is France
struggling to compete with the United States and other emerging
economies outside of Europe, the French economy is facing increasing
pressure to remain competitive alongside its European neighbors. France
ranked 21st in the WEF’s competitiveness rankings for 2012–2013, falling
far behind Germany, which ranked 6th, as well as several other European
economies.37
Although Europe’s economic position has gradually
improved since 2012, France’s rank was downgraded two spots to 23rd in
the competitiveness rankings for 2013–2014.38 On the one hand, the WEF
notes that many features of the French economy help to enhance the

32
Id. (“Although the productivity of a country determines its ability to sustain a high level of
income, it is also one of the central determinants of its returns to investment, which is one of the key
factors explaining an economy’s growth potential.”) (emphasis added).
33
Id.
34
The complete twelve pillars of competitiveness are as follows: (1) institutions; (2) infrastructure;
(3) macroeconomic environment; (4) health and primary education; (5) higher education and training;
(6) goods market efficiency; (7) labor market efficiency; (8) financial market development; (9)
technological readiness; (10) market size; (11) business sophistication; and (12) innovation. Id. at 8.
35
Id.
36
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (“The governments of the Eurozone’s two largest
economies—Germany and France—have been at the forefront of the EU’s crisis response.”); SCHMIEDING
& SCHULZ, supra note 14, at 80 (“The French-German alliance is at the core of European integration
and the euro.”).
37
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, the following European economies
were all ranked ahead of France: Switzerland, which was considered the most competitive country,
ranked 1st, Finland was 3rd, Sweden was 4th, the Netherlands was 5th, Germany was 6th, the U.K. was
8th, Denmark was 12th, Norway was 15th, Austria was 16th, and Belgium was 17th. The United States
was ranked as the 7th most competitive economy. GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013,
supra note 31, at 13.
38
WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014: FULL DATA
EDITION 28 (2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014], available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global CompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf.
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country’s growth potential: France has some of the best infrastructure in the
world (ranked 4th), high levels of education and training (ranked 24th), a
sophisticated and professional business culture (ranked 21st), an impressive
capacity for innovation (ranked 19th), and a large market (ranked 8th).39
On the other hand, the WEF also notes that the rigidity of the French labor
market, which is ranked 116th due to strict hiring and firing rules and
“conflict-ridden labor–employer relations,” poses a significant obstacle to
French competitiveness.40
Rather than addressing the root of the problem through substantive
reform, the French government primarily responded to declining
competitiveness by increasing spending and raising taxes for most of 2012
and early 2013.41 As of November 2012, the French state consumed 57%
of the GDP, and its public debt had risen to over 90% of the GDP.42
French workers also pay the highest aggregate tax rate in the EU at 46% of
France’s GDP.43 France enacted recent labor reform to improve employer
flexibility while also enhancing employee security on June 14, 2013, but
many have argued that the measures fall short of the type of employment
reform the country needs to revitalize the economy.44 According to ING
economist Julien Manceaux, although some of the reforms may help
stimulate growth in 2014 and 2015, they are “too late [as] Italy and Spain
have been adjusting their economies since 2011.”45
As a result of France’s failure to engage in more far-reaching reforms,
the country’s credit rating has suffered a number of significant blows since
2012. Two of the world’s leading credit rating agencies—Moody’s
Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s—both downgraded France’s
sovereign debt from its AAA credit rating in 2012.46 Then, in a surprise

39

Id.
Id.
41
For example, the Socialist government of French President Francois Hollande passed a tax
increase of almost $40 billion in 2012. Horobin & Parussini, supra note 20.
42
Time-Bomb, supra note 22.
43
Phillip Inman, France Told to Reform Labour Market After Second Credit Rating Downgrade,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/france-labour-marketreform-credit-rating-downgrade-sandp.
44
See, e.g., Radu Vranceanu, Who Cares About the Unemployed?, ESSEC BUS. SCH. (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://knowledge.essec.edu/en/economy-finance/reforming-the-french-labor-market-who-cares-about-.html;
Mark John & Nicholas Vinocur, France Passes Reform to Ease Hire-and-Fire Rules, REUTERS (May
14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/14/us-france-reform-idUSBRE94D0OF20130514.
45
Horobin & Parussini, supra note 20.
46
In January of 2012, Standard & Poor’s was the first to lower France’s previously AAA credit
rating to AA+. It attributed the downgrade to “France’s relatively high general government debt, as
well as its labor market rigidities.” France’s Unsolicited Long-Term Ratings Lowered to ‘AA+’;
Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS. (Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter France’s LongTerm Ratings], http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=
1245327295020. On November 19, 2012, Moody’s Investors Service followed suit, announcing its
own downgrade. According to Moody’s explanatory report, the primary consideration motivating
40
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move, on November 8, 2013, Standard and Poor’s downgraded France’s
sovereign debt a second time, bringing the rating down one notch from
AA+ to AA.47 The rating agency criticized a number of recent tax reforms
as inadequate to “raise France’s medium-term growth prospects,” and also
cited France’s inability to raise employment through sufficient labor and
employment reforms as one of the primary reasons for the downgrade.48
As with previous credit rating downgrades, the market reacted to
Standard and Poor’s second downgrade with what has been described as a
“Gallic shrug.”49 On the day of the announcement, the CAC-40 stock
index decreased by 0.8%50 and the yield spread of French over German
debt returned to normal by the close of the European trading day, with
“French bonds yielding 46 basis points more than the German
benchmark.”51 Although the downgrade’s impact on the French debt
market has been minimal, the lowered rating underscores France’s struggle
to improve growth prospects alongside its European peers.52
C. Entrepreneurship and French Regulatory Restrictions
One of the primary factors driving France’s declining competitiveness
and failure to create growth is the country’s lack of entrepreneurial activity.
Compared with the United States and other emerging markets, a much
smaller percentage of the French population engages in entrepreneurial
ventures. According to data collected by the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (the GEM), in 2010, only 5.8% of France’s adult population
engaged in “early-stage entrepreneurial activity.”53 In contrast, 7.6% of the
population in the United States, 14.4% in China, and 17.5% in Brazil were

France’s downgrade was the “risk to economic growth, and therefore to the government’s finances,
posed by the country’s persistent structural economic challenges.” Moody’s Downgrades France’s
Government Bond Rating to Aa1 from Aaa, Maintains Negative Outlook, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (Nov.
19, 2012) [hereinafter Moody’s Downgrades], https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgradesFrances-government-bond-rating-to-Aa1-from-Aaa--PR_260071. Among these structural challenges,
Moody’s highlighted “rigidities in labour and services markets, and low levels of innovation” as factors
that “continue to drive France’s gradual but sustained loss of competitiveness.” Id.
47
Inman, supra note 43.
48
Id.
49
Katie Martin, Le Downgrade: Le Shrug, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/
moneybeat/2013/11/08/le-downgrade-le-shrug/.
50
Id.
51
Nicholas Vinocur, S&P Lowers France Rating on Reform Doubts, Market Unfazed, REUTERS
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/08/uk-france-rating-idUKBRE9A706F20131108.
52
Martin, supra note 49.
53
DONNA J. KELLEY, NIELS BOSMA & JOSE ERNESTO AMOROS, THE GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
MONITOR 2010 GLOBAL REPORT 23 (2010), available at http://entreprenorskapsforum.se/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/GEM-2010-Global-Report.pdf (“Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity
(TEA) includes individuals in the process of starting a business, and those running new businesses less
than 3 ½ years old.”).
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characterized as early-stage entrepreneurs.54 Additionally, according to
commentators, France is “strikingly short” of small- to mid-sized
companies—another sign of low rates of entrepreneurship.55 In Germany,
mid-sized companies referred to as Mittelstand firms form the backbone of
the economy.56 In France, however, there are just over 4,000 mediumsized enterprises, which proportionately amounts to half as many as
Germany and Britain.57 Furthermore, whereas the average German
company has 41 employees, the average French company is much smaller
with just around 14 employees.58
France’s low levels of entrepreneurship can be explained, at least in
part, by the presence of onerous administrative regulations that increase the
costs and complexity of running a business.59 In the WEF’s Global
Competitiveness Report for 2012–2013, France ranked 126th under a
category representing the “burden of government regulation.”60 The
ranking indicates that compliance with government regulatory requirements
is less burdensome in 125 other countries out of a total of 144 countries
surveyed.61 This wide variety of regulatory requirements in France fosters
an unfriendly business environment for entrepreneurial investment.62 In
2012, France ranked 32nd out of a total of 185 economies in the World
Bank’s annual “Ease of Doing Business” scorecard.63 France also placed
23rd under a subcategory representing the “Ease of Starting a Business.”64
Furthermore, France’s position in the rankings has continued to deteriorate
since 2012. In 2013, France dropped two spots on the “Ease of Doing
Business” scorecard to 34th place65 and was additionally downgraded four
54

Id.
Special Report on France: So Much to Do, So Little Time, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012, at 8
[hereinafter Special Report].
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 396. Additionally, when
presented with 16 different factors impacting business, 20.6% of the respondents in the WEF’s
Executive Survey ranked “restrictive labor regulations” as the most problematic obstacle to conducting
business in France. Id. at 168.
60
Id. at 169.
61
Id.
62
Id. According to The Economist, pervasive regulatory restrictions present an easy explanation
for the dearth of successful French entrepreneurs: “Everything from the labour market to pharmacies to
taxis is heavily regulated: no wonder would-be entrepreneurs feel discouraged. No entirely new
company has entered the CAC-40 stockmarket index since it started in 1987; redundancies can lead to
endless court proceedings; and trade unions and protesters tend to take to the streets at the first hint of
reform. It adds up to a deeply anti-business culture.” Special Report, supra note 55.
63
World Bank, Ease of Doing Business in France, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/
data/exploreeconomies/france/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
64
Id.
65
At 34th place, France received a worse “doing business score” than the following European
economies: the United Kingdom at 7th place, Germany at 20th, Switzerland at 28th, and Belgium at
55
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spots to 27th place for “Ease of Starting a Business.”66
Out of a variety of regulatory practices burdening new businesses, this
Note focuses on France’s restrictive employment laws, which play an
integral role in limiting entrepreneurial growth.67 For instance, when
presented with sixteen different factors impacting business, 20.6% of the
respondents in the WEF’s executive survey on global competitiveness
ranked “restrictive labor regulations” as the most problematic obstacle to
conducting business in France.68 In order to better illustrate how
employment laws impact entrepreneurs, the following section examines the
concept of entrepreneurship in greater detail, exploring the relationship
between the law and entrepreneurial activity in particular.
III. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH
By helping bring new ideas and more efficient business models to the
market, entrepreneurship is a tremendous source of growth that can either
be fostered or deterred by a nation’s law-making institutions. After first
defining entrepreneurship and examining the ways in which it contributes
to economic growth, this part pays particular attention to the role of the law
in driving entrepreneurial activity.
While regulations imposed by
employment protection laws discourage entrepreneurs, deregulation
measures may have the potential to stimulate entrepreneurial activity.
A. Defining Entrepreneurship
Although there are a variety of ways of defining what it means to be
an entrepreneur, entrepreneurship has two essential features: (1) the
identification and creation of new economic opportunities, and (2) the
introduction of an idea into the market in the face of uncertainty.69

33th. WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2013: SMARTER REGULATIONS FOR SMALL
AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 3 (10th ed. 2013) [hereinafter ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE],
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing% 20Business/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf.
66
Id. at 164.
67
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 169.
68
Id.
69
Sander Wennekers & A. Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, 13
SMALL BUS. ECON. 27, 31 (1999); see also Magnus Henrekson, Entrepreneurship and Institutions, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 717, 720 (2007) (“[A] person can be said to engage in an entrepreneurial
venture if she either on her own or in teams, and either inside or outside existing organizations: (1)
perceives and creates new economic opportunities (new products, new production methods, new
organizational schemes and new product market combinations); and, (2) introduces her or his idea in
the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles by making decisions on location, form, and the
use of resources and institutions.”).
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First, most scholarly literature on the subject of entrepreneurship
focuses on the ability of entrepreneurs to innovate and generate new
economic opportunities. Joseph A. Schumpeter articulated the most widely
recognized description of the entrepreneur to date as an individual who
“disrupt[s] existing market balances by introducing new products, new
methods of production, devising new business models, or opening new
markets.”70 According to Schumpeter, by innovating and carrying out
“new combinations” in the marketplace, the entrepreneur functions as an
agent of “Creative Destruction”—a key contributor to economic vitality
and development.71
In an overview of recent scholarship on
entrepreneurship, Magnus Henrekson, President of the Research Institute of
Industrial Economics in Stockholm, concludes that entrepreneurship is
“about individuals and organizations—be they new, old, large, or small—
that actively contribute to renewal and change in the economy.”72 An
economist defining entrepreneurship in more practical terms writes the
following: “[A]n entrepreneur is . . . someone who responds affirmatively
to the question ‘I am among those who initially established the
business.’”73 Across a wide body of scholarship, this consistent emphasis
on the entrepreneur’s ability to create new economic opportunities has led
law professors Gordon Smith and Darian Ibrahim to observe that “the most
influential definitions of entrepreneurship revolve around the concept of
opportunities.”74
Second, the ability to assume risk and brave uncertainty is another key
feature of entrepreneurship. In order to introduce new ideas into the
marketplace or be among the first to establish a business, entrepreneurs
need “the daring to embrace risks in the face of” uncertain economic
outcomes.75 Laying the foundation for the observations advanced by
Schumpeter, Frank Knight examined the relationship between
entrepreneurs and uncertainty in his 1921 book “Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit.”76
Under the analytical framework developed by Knight,

70

Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative
Entrepreneurship, 6 ISJLP 153, 155 (2010); see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (5th ed. 1976).
71
D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 1533, 1541–42 (2013); Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do
About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 822 (2007) (“The entrepreneur in the Schumpeterian
scheme provides the driving force in the mechanism of change.”).
72
Henrekson, supra note 69, at 719.
73
Edward P. Lazear, Entrepreneurship, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 649, 650–51 (2005).
74
Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1540; see also Jeremy C. Short et al., The Concept of
“Opportunity” in Entrepreneurship Research: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 36 J.
MGMT. 40, 41 (2010).
75
Henrekson, supra note 69, at 719–20.
76
Licht, supra note 71, at 823; see also Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, LIBRARY OF
ECON. & LIBERTY, available at http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Knight/knRUP1.html.
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“[e]ntrepreneurs’ unique role in the economy (and in society more broadly)
consists of their willingness to bear uncertainties.”77 According to law
professor Amir Licht, the Schumpeterian theory of entrepreneurship
involves a central premise that entrepreneurs are specially equipped to deal
with uncertainty.78
Consequently, Licht himself writes that “the
entrepreneur’s main function is to overcome the difficulties engendered by
uncertainty.”79 Ultimately, the entrepreneur’s ability to capitalize on new
economic opportunities requires the willingness to shoulder economic
uncertainty.
B. The Role of Entrepreneurship in Generating Growth
The two central features at play in the definition of entrepreneurship
also link entrepreneurs to economic growth. In order to thrive and remain
competitive, countries need businesses with the ability to innovate and
identify new opportunities for developing products and services.80 They
also require businesses that can capitalize on cutting-edge knowledge by
establishing new and efficient models to bring their ideas to the market in
spite of economic uncertainty.81 By driving innovation and change in the
national market, entrepreneurs are a key source of growth and
entrepreneurship has attracted increasing attention as a means of
resuscitating depressed economies.82 According to one mainstream
economist, “[T]he entrepreneur is the single most important player in a
modern economy.”83 Various studies and empirical data lend support to
this claim, illustrating a strong correlation between high levels of
entrepreneurship and economic growth. Entrepreneurship also presents an
especially important source of growth and competitiveness for advanced
economies like France.
Entrepreneurship helps stimulate economic growth because larger and
77

Licht, supra note 71, at 823.
Id. at 822.
79
Id.
80
EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 14.
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., HOMBERT ET AL., SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT MAKE IT SAFE TO START A BUSINESS?
EVIDENCE FROM A FRENCH REFORM 2 (2013) (“Over the last decade, policy makers and academics
alike have embraced entrepreneurship as a panacea for many economic challenges.”); Henrekson, supra
note 69, at 718 (“Since the days of Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, and Friedrich Hayek, most
economists have acknowledged the crucial importance of entrepreneurs for growth and for the
organization of economic activity.”); Licht, supra note 71, at 817 (“Fostering entrepreneurship has
become a central policy goal for economic institutions around the world, ranging from regional to
national to international bodies. Underlying this trend is the belief that entrepreneurship is key for a
number of desirable social outcomes, including economic growth, lower unemployment, and
technological modernization.”).
83
Edward P. Lazear, Entrepreneurship 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9109, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9109.pdf.
78
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older companies are not as capable at innovating and capitalizing on new
ideas as smaller-sized start-up firms.84 For instance, the 2013 Index of
Economic Freedom cites to a variety of research findings that new firms
are generally more likely to license new technology and smaller-sized firms
are about twice as likely to file “high-impact” patents as larger firms.85
Researchers have also shown that business turnover is closely linked to
higher wages, increased worker productivity, and overall economic
growth.86 In comparison to incumbent firms whose employment levels had
recently fallen, a study of unemployment reform in France found that
wages and worker productivity levels were higher in newly created firms.87
Within a period of two years after their creation, the value added per
worker was 7,000 euros per year higher for newly created firms than that of
incumbent firms.88 The employees of newly created firms also made
annual wages that were approximately 5,200 euros greater than the salaries
of workers employed by the incumbent firms.89 Based on these findings,
the study concluded that the “labor reallocation process from incumbents to
start-ups can have a positive impact on aggregate productivity, since newly
created firms in the data are on average more productive.”90 Comparing
the top firms of 44 different countries in 1975 with their 1996 counterparts,
another study found that countries with higher rates of firm turnover
experience faster per capita economic growth, greater productivity, and
faster capital growth.91
By enhancing economic vitality and innovation, entrepreneurship
could offer France a valuable solution to the difficulties of remaining
competitive and generating growth. The WEF identifies three stages of
economic development at which countries are faced with different
challenges related to international competitiveness.92 France falls under the
third and final stage, where economic development is “innovation-driven”
and entrepreneurial growth is critical to the country’s continued financial
well-being.93 At the innovation-driven stage, countries can only sustain
their high wages and associated standards of living by fostering businesses
that can compete with “new and/or unique products, services, models, and
84

HERITAGE FOUND., 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 63 (2013), available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/countries/france.pdf (“[B]ig firms, encumbered by larger
internal bureaucracies, are virtually incapable of capitalizing on radical ideas.”).
85
Id.
86
Kathy Fogel, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Big Business Stability and Economic Growth: Is
What’s Good for General Motors Good for America?, 89 J. OF FIN. ECON. 83 (2008).
87
HOMBERT ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 27.
90
Id. at 5.
91
HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84.
92
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 8–9.
93
Id. at 9.
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processes.”94 In order to successfully produce new goods and services,
these businesses need to be capable of deploying “new technologies . . .
and/or the most sophisticated production processes or business models.”95
In order to capitalize on a country’s innovative potential and generate
economic growth, government institutions need to develop a regulatory
framework and infrastructure that encourages higher rates of
entrepreneurial activity.96 The following section therefore examines the
role of institutional factors in shaping entrepreneurial activity by balancing
the inherent uncertainty of creating a business with reductions in the costs
of entrepreneurial risk.
C. Law-Making Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activity
Although cultural and social factors, as well as individual
characteristics, influence entrepreneurship,97 government institutions and
the legal frameworks that they establish can also play a critical role in
shaping entrepreneurial activity.98
In an overview of recent scholarship on entrepreneurship, one
commentator remarked that “[t]he role of institutions has in recent years reemerged as a dominant explanation of long-term economic performance.”99
Contributing to this view, recent studies have shown that very few
differences in self-employment rates actually attribute to observable worker
characteristics, which suggests that institutions can play an important role
in shaping entrepreneurial activity.100
94

Id.
Id.
96
EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 14; Thomas S. Ulen, Why Do Entrepreneurs
Appear and Flourish?, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 775, 776 (2007) (observing that “there is
widespread belief that growth necessitates creating an environment in which entrepreneurs can prosper”).
97
Some scholars challenge the argument that legal regulations impose barriers to entrepreneurial
development by contending that a purely legal approach fails to account for “national cultural attitudes
toward business and the state.” Providing Italy as an example, one scholar asserts that culture plays a
pivotal role in determining whether laws are taken seriously or actually enforced. In countries like
Italy, where citizens show little concern with observing “minor” administrative and bureaucratic
regulations, laws would only present insignificant obstacles to entrepreneurial development. Richard P.
Taub, Research on Entrepreneurship, Culture, and Law, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 893, 895 (2007).
98
See, e.g., Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 154 (“[T]he legal system may provide an
additional, yet ill-understood and hence underutilized mechanism to stimulate domestic
entrepreneurship, one of the central pillars in revitalizing economic growth.”).
99
Henrekson, supra note 69, at 721; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking
Law’s Relationship to the Economy—Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831, 831 (2009)
(noting that the idea that “law is essential to economic development has a long and venerable history”).
100
Raquel Fonseca et al., Entrepreneurship, Wealth, Liquidity Constraints, and Start-Up Costs, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 637 (2007). But see Marc Cowling & William D. Bygrave,
Entrepreneurship, Welfare Provision, and Unemployment: Relationships Between Unemployment,
Welfare Provision, and Entrepreneurship in Thirty-Seven Nations Participating in the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (Gem) 2002, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 617, 635 (2007) (questioning the
95
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According to scholars, the law offers two central mechanisms for
driving entrepreneurship.101
First, the law creates entrepreneurial
opportunities through property rights, which ensure that entrepreneurs
retain the benefits of their success.102 Second, measures that reduce entry
costs can also foster favorable conditions for entrepreneurship by
minimizing the regulatory and administrative burdens required of
entrepreneurs.103 Although France already has a well-established and
progressive body of property law, the law imposes a wide variety of
regulatory requirements on entrepreneurs that raise entry costs.
Consequently, the remainder of this Note will focus on France’s potential
to raise rates of entrepreneurial activity through measures that reduce the
entry costs associated with creating a business.
1. Regulatory Barriers Discourage Entrepreneurial Growth
In order to understand how law-making institutions can help stimulate
entrepreneurship by reducing entry costs, one needs to first consider the
specific ways in which regulations create barriers for entrepreneurial
ventures.104 Rather than serving as a positive source of economic growth,
many legal scholars argue that regulations exert a negative impact on
entrepreneurial activity by raising the costs of starting a new business.105
According to a 2007 study by Vesa Kanniainen and Panu Poutvaara, entry
costs “operate like a tax on entrepreneurship” and excessive government
ability of reforms that remove institutional barriers to promote entrepreneurship, “given that cultural
aspects appear to play such an important role in defining peoples pre-disposition toward entrepreneurial
activity”).
101
In 1956, Willard Hurst advanced the theory that the legal system could be harnessed to promote
“‘the release of individual creative energy’” through two important mechanisms for facilitating the
creation of entrepreneurial opportunities: (1) “ensuring that entrepreneurs retain the benefits of their
success”; and (2) “reducing the costs of action and even failure.” Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at
1551–52.
102
Id. at 1553–54.
103
Id. at 1562.
104
Vesa Kanniainen & Panu Poutvaara, Imperfect Transmission of Tacit Knowledge and Other
Barriers to Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 675 (2007) (“To develop policies toward
entrepreneurship, it is important to identify the barriers in the market for entrepreneurship to alleviate
the effects of those distortions.”).
105
Simon C. Parker, Law and The Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
695, 706 (2007) (“Overall, despite ongoing disagreement among researchers, both the theory and
evidence point to somewhat stronger negative impacts on entrepreneurship and growth from regulation
than positive or neutral effects.”); see also HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 88; Henrekson, supra
note 69, at 720; Jolanda Hessels, André van Stel, Peter Brouwer & Sander Wennekers, Social Security
Arrangements and Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 743 (2007);
André van Stel, David J. Storey & A. Roy Thurik, The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and
Young Business Entrepreneurship, 28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 171 (2007); Martin T. Robson, Does Stricter
Employment Protection Legislation Promote Self-employment?, 21 SMALL BUS. ECON. 309, 310
(2003).
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regulation “results in reduced enterprise formation.”106 Extensive and
complex regulatory requirements impose entry barriers and limit the ability
of entrepreneurial ventures to grow by (1) restricting operational flexibility;
and (2) raising transaction costs that disproportionately impact small
businesses.
Employment protection legislation (EPL), for instance, can exercise a
significant impact on levels of entrepreneurship and serve as an instructive
example of how too much regulation can impede economic growth.
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), employment protection encompasses regulations
regarding job creation and termination.107 Regulations over job creation
can encompass rules favoring particular disadvantaged groups, conditions
for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, and employee training
requirements.108 Regulations governing termination establish redundancy
procedures, mandate notification periods and severance payments, and
institute special requirements for collective dismissals.109 In assessing the
ease of conducting business in various countries, the World Bank asserts
that the rigidity of a nation’s employment laws over hiring and firing
“sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open
and run a small to medium-size business.”110
First, rigid labor laws that limit operational flexibility prevent growth
by restricting new businesses from adapting workforce personnel to their
evolving business needs.111 In an open economy with changing market
conditions, businesses require the flexibility to rapidly readjust the size of
their workforce based on shifts in performance and rates of return.112 The
efficiency and flexibility of the labor market is also critical for ensuring
that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and
provided with sufficient incentives to work to the best of their ability.113
Therefore, labor markets as well as entrepreneurs benefit from the ability to
rapidly shift workers from one economic activity to another at low cost.114
Second, overly restrictive employment laws deter entrepreneurial
ventures by raising the transaction costs of running a new business.115
Because small- and medium-sized firms cannot afford the hiring and firing
106

Kanniainen & Poutvaara, supra note 104, at 680.
Parker, supra note 105, at 704.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE, supra note 65, at 4.
111
EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 17.
112
Id. at 18.
113
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 31, at 6.
114
Id.
115
Juan Pablo Couyoumdjian, Who Walks out? Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy, 32 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 158, 161 (2012) (observing that “as agents find it less profitable to engage in entrepreneurial
activities we will observe a lower overall level of entrepreneurship and, thus, lower economic growth”).
107
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costs imposed by employment protection legislation, “[i]t is commonly
argued that EPL retards entrepreneurship by disproportionately imposing
burdens on the smallest firms.”116
By imposing burdens on small- and medium-sized businesses, overly
restrictive employment laws can create barriers to entrepreneurial success
and discourage the type of risk taking required to launch a new business.
EPL illustrates how an extensive regulatory framework can ultimately harm
a country’s growth prospects by preventing entrepreneurship. Accordingly,
scholars have expressed dismay that governments continue to tighten
regulations while also proclaiming the values of entrepreneurship.117
Instead, lawmakers should actively promote growth by reducing the costs
of entrepreneurial risk through deregulation measures.
2. Regulatory Relaxation Encourages Entrepreneurial Activity
Rather than raising transaction costs and restricting entrepreneurial
flexibility, reforms that reduce the costs of entrepreneurial risk-taking can
stimulate heightened levels of entrepreneurship. Policies of deregulation
and institutional measures to protect entrepreneurs if their endeavors fail
are therefore two potentially influential mechanisms for raising rates of
entrepreneurship.
First, one critical way to encourage entrepreneurship is by
implementing policies of deregulation. Influenced by a system of “crony
capitalism,” politicians have a tendency to represent the interests of
established businesses to the detriment of new economic entrants.118
Politicians can therefore deploy taxes, fees, and regulations, which all serve
as barriers to entry, to help entrench incumbent firms and block
entrepreneurial action.119 According to the Legal Origins Theory, however,
the law matters because it has the potential to facilitate transactions and
drive economic development by eliminating barriers to entry.120 Under this

116

Parker, supra note 105, at 704; see also Henrekson, supra note 69, at 738 (“[A]ny costs imposed
by labor security regulation are likely to fall more heavily on younger, smaller, and less capitalintensive employers. To the extent that entrepreneurial firms are overrepresented in these categories,
labor security regulation disproportionally burdens entrepreneurial firms.”).
117
Parker, supra note 105, at 706.
118
Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1565; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 899–900 (1987) (Analyzing empirical evidence
regarding United States legislative politics, Farber and Frickey observe that the greater economic
interests of their constituencies do not influence legislators’ votes. Instead, they theorize “(1) that
reelection is an important motive of legislators; (2) that constituent and contributor interests thus
influence legislators; and (3) that small, easily organized interest groups have an influence
disproportionate to the size of their membership.”). Id.
119
Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1565.
120
See, e.g., id. at 1563–64; Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,
46 J. ECON. LIT. 285, 306–309 (2008); Milhaupt, supra note 99.
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line of reasoning, governments can and should actively promote growth
and competitiveness by implementing policies of deregulation: “[I]f
governments can overcome entrenched interests and institute policies of
deregulation that do not harm their other social objectives, they may be
able to seize a precious opportunity to stimulate entrepreneurship and
greater competitiveness by easing the burden of regulation on small
businesses.”121
Second, government policies that shield entrepreneurs from economic
failure can also stimulate entrepreneurship.122 For example, one study
examining the impact of French labor reforms targeted at the unemployed
found that government subsidies that provide economic insurance to
entrepreneurs in the case of failure increased rates of entrepreneurial
activity.123 According to the study, the reform’s implementation was
followed by a 25% increase in monthly business creation rates across
industries.124
Furthermore, reform measures that facilitate entrepreneurial entry do
not appear to decrease the quality of entrepreneurs or contribute to the
creation of a greater number of unsuccessful business endeavors.
According to the study conducted on French employment reform, the
reform did not alter the educational background of business founders,
which were not “significantly different” from the background of business
founders prior to the reform.125 The reform also led to the creation of more
“ambitious” firms that were more likely to hire.126 In comparison to
control groups, entrepreneurs operating in industries impacted by the
reform were 3.8% more likely to have plans to hire in the next twelve
months.127 As a result of these findings, researchers concluded that “[t]he
reduction in the cost of entry triggered by the reform then allows for a
larger pool of equally talented people to enter self-employment.”128
Countries that implement policies to balance the uncertainty of
bringing new ideas to the market with reductions in the costs of
entrepreneurial risk can thus actively promote growth. However, extensive
legal regulations that restrict entrepreneurial flexibility and thus raise
transaction costs deter would-be entrepreneurs from bringing new ideas to
the market. At the moment, French employment laws discourage
121

Parker, supra note 105, at 707–08; see also Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71 at 1565 (“Any legal
system that wishes to promote entrepreneurial action must employ mechanisms that constrain the
inevitable pressure to favor incumbent firms.”).
122
Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 71, at 1562 (“[I]f we want entrepreneurs to exploit entrepreneurial
opportunities, we must also reduce the costs of their failure.”).
123
HOMBERT ET AL., supra note 82, at 6.
124
Id. at 4.
125
Id. at 22–23.
126
Id. at 4.
127
Id. at 23.
128
Id. at 19.
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entrepreneurial activity by imposing excessive regulations on business
start-ups. The following section therefore examines specific French laws
that inhibit entrepreneurship through the over regulation of the labor
market.
IV. FRENCH EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LAWS INHIBIT
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY AND STIFLE GROWTH
By focusing on worker-protective norms, and eschewing a liberal
view of the role of law, French employment law contributes to an antibusiness environment that impedes entrepreneurial growth.
After
providing a brief legal framework for French employment law, this part
will highlight specific regulatory measures that are harmful to business
start-ups, first looking at rigid hiring and firing procedures that raise the
cost of entrepreneurial risk taking and encourage workplace inefficiency.
Next, this part will demonstrate how complex statutory regulations that are
triggered by expansions in workforce personnel restrict business growth
and lead to inefficient allocations of French labor resources after the
employment relationship is created. Finally, this part will conclude by
discussing how large social security payments impose prohibitive costs on
small- to medium-sized businesses and remove incentives to engage in
entrepreneurial activity.
A. Legal Framework for French Employment Law
In the French system, employment law, or droit du travail,
encompasses both “labor law” and “employment law.”129 While French
labor law involves such issues as industrial relations, unionization, and
collective bargaining, employment law covers issues like individual labor
contracts, redundancy, and anti-discrimination regulation.130 In France,
both labor and employment law implement norms that derive from several
sources: constitutional law, statutory law, case law, collective agreements,
and individual contracts.131 This Note will predominantly focus on aspects
of French employment law governed by statutes codified in the French
Labor Code or Code du travail, specifically looking at labor contracts
within the context of hiring and firing laws, legal regulations associated
with workplace size, and social security laws. Generally, legal scholars
characterize French statutes, including the Code du travail, as much more
detailed and rigid than those of their European counterparts.132 Whereas
129

François Gaudu, Labour Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 395, 395 (George A.
Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2008).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 397.
132
Id. at 398.
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other European countries, like Germany, leave many of the details of
implementation to collective bargaining, very detailed French regulations
place greater constraints on employer flexibility and “make law difficult to
understand for ordinary people.”133
In addition to the legal complexity of the French statutory law
codified in the Code du travail, two different characterizations of the
appropriate role for the state in shaping the national labor market have an
impact on employers. On the one hand, a liberal, free-market approach
asserts that sources of employment law should merely provide a legal
framework to validate private employment agreements and provide for
their enforcement.134
On the other hand, an alternative approach
emphasizes the importance of maintaining “social public order,” or l’ordre
public social, by establishing a protective framework for worker’s rights.135
Because workers are subordinated to their employers under the
employment contract, this second approach stresses the need for a certain
degree of state protection.136 Adopting a worker-protective approach,
French judges often resolve employment disputes based on the principle
that “the norm that is most advantageous for employees shall prevail.”137
Employers lose around 75% of the cases brought to French labor courts,138
and roughly one out of every four French employees brings a case to these
courts, which have been described as “the least business-friendly in
Europe.”139
Ultimately, the complexity of French employment law and the French
legal system’s emphasis on worker protection is reflected by the country’s
hiring and firing procedures, the laws governing business expansion, and
the social security regime, all of which limit employer flexibility,
encourage workplace inefficiency and raise transaction costs.
B. Restrictions on Hiring Flexibility
In France, the act of entering into an employment contract activates a
variety of mandatory statutory rules and collective labor agreements.140
133

Gaudu, supra note 129, at 398–99.
Mark Freedland, Beyond the Public Law/Private Law Dichotomy: Employment Law, in
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 483, 487 (2d ed. 2008).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 399.
138
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 68 (2004) [hereinafter
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK], available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO68_MAIN.
139
Matthew Melchiorre, France’s Disappointing Labor Reforms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0205/France-s-disappointing-labor-reforms.
140
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 397. One well-known example of this is the infamous 35-hour
workweek, which was implemented by law no. 2000-37 of 19 January 2000 and is more popularly
known as the Loi Aubry. Loi Aubry reduced the basic working week from 39 hours to 35 hours. When
134
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Consequently, employers are automatically bound by a variety of
obligations that they cannot contract away.141 Furthermore, regardless of
how two parties characterize their relationship, they are deemed to have
entered into an employment contract whenever a worker accepts a
relationship of “subordination” to an employer by performing services for
the employer in consideration for wages.142 Several different forms of
employment contracts exist in France, including: open-ended or fixed-term
contracts, full-time or part-time contracts, and contracts based on direct
recruitment or indirect recruitment through a temporary employment
agency.143
Despite what appears to be a variety of options, however, employers
often lack the flexibility to select the employment relationship that best
suits their business needs. Although the French legal system technically
recognizes several types of employment contracts, the predominant type is
an open-ended, full-time contract with an unspecified duration.144 This
type of contract is called the contrat de travail à durée indeterminée (the
CDI) and is presumptively favored by French courts.145 As a result, French
employment law has been described as creating a dual employment
structure, pitting the CDI as the most common contractual arrangement
against all the other less common forms of temporary and fixed-term
contracts.146 The CDI represents around 90% of total employment.147
The prominence of the CDI is the product of a number of French
statutory measures that limit an employer’s ability to freely fashion the type
of employment relationship that best suits his or her business needs.
Whereas no conditions need to be satisfied in order to form a CDI, every
other employment contract must conform to strict statutory conditions.148
For example, French law prohibits employers from relying on fixed-term or
temporary employment contracts for most jobs considered to fulfill the
durable and long-term needs of an employer’s business.149 In France,
employees enter into an employment contract, there is an entire legal regime just concerning working
time, night work, rest periods, and holidays, which is structured on “the basic pillars of the 35-hour
week.” According to scholarly commentators, “[t]he resulting provisions . . . form an immensely
complex regime for the control of working time, in which legislation and collective bargaining (or
réglementation) are very elaborately intertwined.” Freedland, supra note 134, at 501.
141
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 397.
142
Id.
143
M. JEAN-CLAUDE JAVILLIER, MANUEL DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL [EMPLOYMENT LAW] 186–87 (4th
ed. 1992).
144
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401.
145
Id.
146
Vranceanu, supra note 44.
147
Id.
148
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1242-1 (Fr.); JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 187.
149
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401. The French Code du travail prohibits the use of fixed-term
contracts for permanent tasks and limits the maximum length of fixed-term contracts to eighteen
months, subject to some minor exceptions. ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE, supra note 65, at 106.
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fixed-term contracts are created by the contrat de travail à durée
determinée (CDD)150 and temporary work contracts are formed by the
contrat de travail à temporaire (CTT).151 French courts interpret the
statutory language governing the CDD as expressly prohibiting employers
from offering fixed-term contracts for positions that are not of a “temporary
nature.”152 Courts have also blocked efforts on the part of employers to
circumvent the open-ended, full-time CDI by engaging the same workers
under multiple successive contracts that only last for a limited duration.153
According to a decision by the Cour de cassation, which is France’s
highest court for judicial matters, employer reliance on multiple CDDs
“requires verification that the recourse to successive CDDs is justified.”154
In order to make this justification, employers need to present “concrete
elements establishing the temporary nature of the position in question.”155
Furthermore, employment relationships created by the CDDs and
CTTs, or any other contractual arrangements other than the CDI, trigger
other additional statutory requirements that restrict employer flexibility
with respect to scheduling and assigning work hours. For example,
employers are often required to set a predetermined work schedule for parttime employees and the law limits the employer’s ability to assign
additional hours or depart from the pre-determined schedule.156 All of
these restrictions reinforce a “very strong insistence” within French
employment law on the use of CDIs, reflecting the legal system’s
preference for full-time, open-ended employment relationships.157
By focusing disproportionately on worker protection and understating
the interests of private employers, rigid hiring practices limit the type of
workforce flexibility required by entrepreneurs. In particular, the treatment
of the CDI as France’s default employment contract is significant because
150

CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1242-1 (Fr.) (“Un contrat de travail à durée déterminée, quel
que soit son motif, ne peut avoir ni pour objet ni pour effet de pourvoir durablement un emploi lié à
l’activité normale et permanente de l’entreprise.”); Freedland, supra note 134, at 497.
151
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1251-1 (Fr.); Freedland, supra note 134, at 497.
152
See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Dec. 12, 2012, Bull. civ.
V, No. 22302 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Sept. 26, 2012,
Bull. civ. V, No. 26019 (Fr.).
153
See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., June 22, 2011, Bull. civ.
V, No. 6944 (Fr.) (finding that employer mislabeled worker as a CDD employee where the employer
had engaged the employee for multiple successive limited-term contracts); Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Mar. 24, 2010, Bull. civ. V, No. 42186 (Fr.) (reclassifying
employee engaged by employer under 23 CDDs as having CDI status).
154
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., June 22, 2011, Bull. civ. V,
No. 6944 (Fr.) (“[L]’utilisation de contrats à durée déterminée successifs, impose de vérifier que le
recours à l’utilisation de contrats successifs est justifié par des raisons objectives qui s’entendent de
l’existence d’éléments concrets établissant le caractère par nature temporaire de l’emploi.”).
155
Id.
156
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401.
157
Freedland, supra note 134, at 497–98.
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it severely restricts the ability of employers to adapt workforce personnel to
the evolving needs of their businesses.158 For new business ventures, every
job is important and hiring entails both a great deal of risk as well as a
significant expense in terms of screening, interviewing, and training.159
Entrepreneurs need the flexibility to adapt their business model and the size
of their workforce to an evolving and unpredictable market. By effectively
forcing employers to create full-time, long-term contracts, and thus
preventing employers from freely creating the employment relationship
that best suits their needs, French employment law elevates the costs of
entrepreneurial risk taking. Employment protection legislation that restricts
hiring flexibility by limiting the way employers characterize the
employment relationship, therefore, places entrepreneurs at a disadvantage
from the earliest stages of business development.160
C. Restrictions on Firing Flexibility
Rigid firing procedures are an additional and closely associated
obstacle to entrepreneurial growth that limit the employer’s flexibility and
increase the risks of starting a business. In France, employee dismissals,
regardless of the cause, are costly and entail a great deal of legal
complexity. Employers are almost always required to give notice and
provide for a dismissal allowance, the level of which depends on the
dismissed employee’s seniority.161
The World Bank calculates a
“redundancy cost indicator” measuring the overall cost of “advance notice
payments, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a
redundant worker” as expressed in weeks of the terminated worker’s
salary.162 In France, for a worker with ten years of tenure, employers pay
the equivalent of 8.7 weeks of the terminated worker’s salary in severance
costs.163 Averaging dismissal costs for workers with one, five, and ten
years of tenure, employers pay the equivalent of 4.6 weeks of a dismissed
worker’s salary in severance payments and other costs.164
In addition to the expense of dismissing an employee, employers can
only terminate their employees for reasons recognized under the French
Code du travail and often need to satisfy a variety of other termination
requirements, which are determined based on the employer’s rationale for

158

JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 222–23.
See Parker, supra note 105, at 704.
160
Id.
161
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 401.
162
WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2014, ECONOMY PROFILE: FRANCE 102
(11th ed. 2014), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/~/media/giawb/doing%
20business/documents/profiles/country/FRA.pdf?ver=2.
163
Id.
164
Id.
159
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dismissal.165 Although it might seem as though an employer should be free
to terminate an employee under an open-ended CDI with no-fixed term, in
practice, these contracts cannot be terminated “unless very stringent
conditions are filled.”166 There are two separate justifications that can
provide French employers with grounds for terminating an employment
relationship: (1) economic dismissals, which are connected to the economic
situation of the employer; and (2) non-economic dismissals, which are
connected to the behavior or performance of the terminated worker.167
Although economic dismissals and non-economic dismissals entail
different procedural requirements, both forms of dismissal interfere with
the employer’s ability to manage his or her own workforce.
1. Economic Dismissals
French employers must satisfy a variety of highly specific, complex,
and costly requirements to terminate economically redundant employees.
In order to justify economic dismissals, employers need to meet three basic
conditions: they must (1) show that they have an economic reason for the
dismissal that is both “real and serious” (une cause réelle et sérieuse); (2)
satisfy certain procedural requirements; and (3) undertake an “employment
maintenance plan” or “social plan” to try and re-establish dismissed
workers, in the case of collective dismissals.168
First, economic reasons for dismissal encompass financial difficulties,
technological change, or any business reorganizations necessary to
maintain competitiveness.169 However, when the dismissal is adjudicated,
French judges apply a proportionality principle in determining whether the
economic motive is sufficiently serious.170 The judicial proportionality test
entails weighing the advantages an employer derives from dismissal against
the detriment suffered by the dismissed employee.171 If a judge concludes
that the harm experienced by the employee outweighs the advantages
sought by the employer, then the employer is found to lack the real and
serious grounds required for dismissal.172
Second, employers must notify the appropriate administrative
authority of the dismissal, and demonstrate that they complied with the
appropriate standard dismissal procedures, which may vary depending on

165

Amanda K. Caldwell, Employment Law in France: The Basics, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP (Jan. 22,
2013), http://www.crossborderemployer.com/post/2013/01/22/Employment-Law-in-France-The-Basics.aspx.
166
Vranceanu, supra note 44.
167
Freedland, supra note 134, at 495.
168
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 402.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 401–02.
171
Id.
172
Id.
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whether the employer is implementing an individual or collective
dismissal.173 As part of this process, the administrative authority has the
discretion to review such matters as the employer’s economic reasons for
dismissal, the number of positions eliminated and the category of the
workers affected, the criteria used to select which workers to dismiss, and
the measures taken to re-establish the terminated workers.174
Third, employers have a duty to attempt to re-establish employees
dismissed based on economic grounds due to collective redundancies. In
order to satisfy this duty, employers with fifty or more employees who
dismiss more than ten employees over a thirty-day time period must
prepare a “social plan,” or “employment maintenance plan,” referred to in
French as a plan social or plan de sauvegarde d’emploi.175 The employment
maintenance plan provides an overview of how the employer handled the
economic redundancy as well as their justifications for dismissal.176 The
purpose of the maintenance plan is to demonstrate that the employer
considered all of the available alternatives to dismissal, such as proposals
“to transfer workers, to change the terms and conditions of employment, to
transfer workers to other companies within a holding group, to order
outplacement, and to institute training measures.”177
Employers must both consult with a Comité d’entreprise, referred to
in English as a “Works Council,” regarding the maintenance plan and then
submit the plan to the Directeur départemental du travail for
administrative approval.178 However, as a substitute to preparing a
maintenance plan and meeting all the other statutory requirements for
economic dismissals, sometimes employers will simply make arrangements
with employees directly, providing them with early retirement or cash
bonuses to encourage less burdensome “voluntary” departures as an
informal means of working around the law.179
2. Non-Economic Dismissals
The legal requirements for non-economic dismissals also disfavor
employers and leave French judges with broad discretion to apply worker173
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Detailed Information on Employment Protection: France,
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/France.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Employment Protection];
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403.
174
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403.
175
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1233-61 (Fr.) (“Dans les entreprises d’au moins cinquante
salariés, lorsque le projet de licenciement concerne au moins dix salariés dans une même période de
trente jours, l’employeur établit et met en oeuvre un plan de sauvegarde de l’emploi pour éviter les
licenciements ou en limiter le nombre.”).
176
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1233-62 (Fr.); Freedland, supra note 134, at 495–96.
177
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403.
178
Employment Protection, supra note 173; Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403.
179
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 403.
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protective norms. Similar to the first requirement for economic dismissals,
an employer must establish that they have a “real and serious cause” (une
cause réelle et sérieuse de licenciement) for the termination of an employee
in a non-economic dismissal.180 In principle, this requirement can be
satisfied by a variety of circumstances: disciplinary misconduct, loss of
confidence, professional inadequacy, and illness.181 According to scholarly
commentators, however, courts have applied this requirement
inconsistently, and “a real and serious cause can be found to exist just as
easily when a worker has committed some misconduct as it can be found to
exist in the absence of misconduct.”182
French judges have broad discretion in determining whether an
employer has demonstrated a real and serious cause for termination. If a
non-economic dismissal results in litigation, Article L1235-1 of the Code
du travail stipulates that, whenever a doubt exists as to whether the
employer has proven that termination is warranted under the real and
serious cause requirement, the judge should hold in favor of the
employee.183 France’s constitutional court, the Conseil constitutionnel, has
even upheld the constitutionality of this provision, reasoning that, so long
as proper civil procedures are observed and the judge has an opportunity to
weigh the evidence presented by both sides, “judicial control over the legal
conditions for termination [in favor of the employee] is in no way contrary
to the principle of equality before the law.”184 The unpredictability that
results from such broad judicial discretion may explain why the majority of
employee dismissals are economic in nature.185
For both economic and non-economic dismissals alike, France’s
stringent requirements governing firing procedures prevent firms from
terminating poor-performing and redundant employees, which increases the
production costs of running a new business and severely limits the
efficiency of a firm’s business operations.186 Rigid French dismissal laws

180

Id. at 402.
JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 234–36.
182
Id. at 233 (“Il peut donc exister une cause reelle et serieuse lorsqu’une faute a ete commise par
le salarie, comme en absence d’une telle faute.”).
183
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1235-1 (Fr.) (“En cas de litige, le juge, à qui il appartient
d’apprécier la régularité de la procédure suivie et le caractère réel et sérieux des motifs invoqués par
l’employeur, forme sa conviction au vu des éléments fournis par les parties après avoir ordonné, au
besoin, toutes les mesures d’instruction qu’il estime utiles. Si un doute subsiste, il profite au salarié.”)
(emphasis added).
184
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 89-257DC, July 25, 1989, Rec.
59 (Fr.) (“[L]e contrôle juridictionnel des conditions légales du licenciement, ne sont en rien contraires
au principe d’égalité des citoyens devant la loi.”); JAVILLIER, supra note 143, at 232–33.
185
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 402.
186
HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 90 (“The ability of businesses to contract freely for labor
and dismiss redundant workers when they are no longer needed is a vital mechanism for enhancing
productivity and sustaining overall economic growth.”).
181
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not only force firms to retain poor performers and redundant employees,
but also increase the likelihood of poor employee performance. When
employment protection legislation shields workers from the job market,
studies indicate that workers are less efficient and exert less effort than they
would under more competitive circumstances.187
Labeling this phenomenon as the “X-inefficiency,” economist Harvey
Leigenstein explains: “In situations where competitive pressure is light,
many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, or search for the
utility of feeling less pressure.”188 According to Leigenstein, in the absence
of competitive market conditions, employees appear less compelled to
work effectively and expend less personal effort at performing their jobs
well.189 As a result, operational expenses in an “X-inefficient” firm will be
greater than those in a competitive firm where labor regulations do not
protect workers from the free market.190 In this respect, France’s onerous
termination procedures disadvantage entrepreneurs by not only raising the
costs of risk, but also by contributing to lower rates of productivity and
efficiency.
D. Legal Constraints on Expansion
One of the key factors contributing to the declining competitiveness of
France, as well as Europe, is the failure to generate “new businesses
destined for growth.”191 Prior to the market crash in 2008, Europe already
trailed behind the U.S. in producing new businesses. Only twelve new
companies from Europe broke into the top 500 public companies from
1950 to 2007, whereas America contributed fifty-two new companies.192
Additionally, in the 1990s, one study found that while 19 percent of midsized American firms could be characterized as “fast-growers,” the same
characterization was true of only 4 percent of the companies in six
European countries, including France.193
French employment protection legislation penalizes growing
businesses by requiring firms to satisfy costly and complex legal
requirements as they increase in size, thus discouraging the type of growth
the country needs. Looking at the relationship between employment
regulations that significantly raise labor costs once French firms reach 50
employees and French firm size, a study conducted by researchers at the
London School of Economics found that France has a surprisingly large
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

546

Id. at 61.
Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency,’ 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 413 (1966).
Id.
Id.
European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2012, at 30.
Id.
Id.
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number of companies with forty-nine employees, whereas this is not the
case in American firms.194 In 2008, a French commission charged with
writing a report on growth found that once an enterprise employs fifty
workers, no fewer than thirty-four laws and regulations start to apply.195
According to the commission’s report, the cost of these regulations
amounts to 4 percent of a firm’s total payroll.196
Thus, the empirical data indicates that, when determining firm size,
many small business owners are influenced by considerations weighing the
benefits of expansion against the costs of increased labor regulation.197
Based on their findings that far fewer French firms expand on the same
scale as productive U.S. firms, researchers at the London School of
Economics concluded that French employment regulations offer an
“attractive” explanation for the country’s productivity gap.198 In order to
avoid costly labor regulations, many highly productive firms fail to reach
their optimal size, which contributes to a misallocation of French labor
resources and harms entrepreneurial growth.199
E. Social Security Costs
Due to its robust public welfare system, France is one of the most
successful countries in the world at minimizing income disparities between
the wealthy and the poor.200 However, France’s national social security
194

Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity
Distribution: Evidence from France 2, 15 (London Sch. of Econ., Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Working
Paper, 2012), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1128.pdf (Out of the total number of
French firms researched, “[t]here are just over 400 ﬁrms with exactly 49 employees and then only about
130 with 50 employees.”).
195
JACQUES ATTALI, RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION POUR LA LIBÉRATION DE CROISSANCE
FRANÇAISE [COMMISSION REPORT ON THE DEREGULATION OF FRENCH ECONOMIC GROWTH] 48 (2008),
available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000041/0000.pdf;
Special Report, supra note 55.
196
Id. (“Les seuils sociaux constituent aujourd’hui un frein à la croissance et à la création d’emploi.
À titre d’exemple, le passage de 49 à 50 salariés entraîne actuellement l’application de 34 législations et
réglementations supplémentaires dont le coût représente 4% de la masse salariale.”).
197
Special Report, supra note 55.
198
Garicano, Lelarge & Reenen, supra note 194, at 15.
199
Id. at 21 (“Intuitively, ﬁrms will optimally choose to remain small to avoid the regulation, so the
size distribution becomes distorted with ‘too many’ ﬁrms just below the size threshold and ‘too few’
ﬁrms just above it. Furthermore, the distribution of productivity is also distorted: some of those ﬁrms
just below the cut-off are ‘too productive’ as they have been prevented from growing to their optimal
size by the regulation. We show how the regulation creates welfare losses by (i) allocating too little
employment to more productive ﬁrms who choose to be just below the regulatory threshold, (ii)
allocating too little employment to more productive ﬁrms because they bear the implicit labor tax
(whereas small ﬁrms do not) and (iii) through reducing equilibrium wages (due to some tax incidence
falling on workers) this encourages too many individuals to become small entrepreneurs rather than
working as employees for more productive entrepreneurs.”).
200
Using the Gini coefficient as a rough measure of inequality, which ranges from 0 (representing
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system, the Sécurité sociale more commonly referred to as Sécu, imposes
burdensome costs on employers.201 Sécu is a compulsory insurance that
provides for healthcare, pensions, family allowances, and unemployment
benefits to employees.202 Healthcare, pension, and unemployment benefits
are allowances that depend, at least in part, on the level of an employee’s
wages, while family allowances are granted regardless of income.203 Sécu
is funded by a tax on jobs that is unevenly shared by workers and
employers, with most of the burden falling on employers.204 In 2007, in
order to fund employer Sécu contributions both large and small, French
companies were found to pay the equivalent of a 42.3% tax on top of each
employee’s salary in comparison to the equivalent of a 10.5% tax paid by
UK employers for social security costs.205
Sécu imposes higher labor costs on French employers than the social
security regimes of most other European countries.206 According to a
recent study, German companies pay 17 percent of workers’ gross salaries
in social charges, whereas French companies pay 38 percent.207 With
employer social-security contributions coming in at almost 30 percent of
labor costs in 2011, France eclipses Italy, Sweden, Spain, Germany, and
Britain in social charges.208 Furthermore, even in Italy, which has the
highest social charges after France, social-security contributions amount to
less than 25 percent of labor costs.209 As a result, the chief executive of
Valeo, one of the world’s biggest car-parts companies, has been quoted
saying that unaffordable employer social security contributions present one
of the biggest problems for companies in France.210
Having now examined some major deficiencies in French employment
law that discourage entrepreneurial activity and hinder job creation, the
following part will continue the analysis by suggesting some key areas
where deregulation measures might help to stimulate growth.

perfect equality) to 1 (representing perfect inequality), as of 2004, France reduced inequality to 0.248
over the past quarter century. In contrast, the United States has seen significant increases in the Gini
coefficient over the same period and has a score of 0.450. LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., COUNTRY
PROFILE: FRANCE (2007), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/France.pdf.
201
Id.
202
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 406.
203
Id.
204
LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200.
205
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 404.
206
LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200.
207
France’s Economy: The Performance Gap, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012 at 27.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
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V. ENCOURAGING ENTREPRENEURSHIP THROUGH FUTURE
EMPLOYMENT REFORM
On June 14, 2013, France enacted labor market reform through the Loi
relative a la sécurisation de l’emploi, which is referred to in English as the
“Law for the Security of Employment.”211 This law implemented a
combination of reforms that were intended to enhance employer flexibility
in the management of workforce personnel on the one hand, and to provide
greater job security for employees and greater access to information
regarding an employer’s business decisions on the other.212 However, a
number of commentators have criticized the French reform as being too
modest to bring about any substantive change in the country’s rigid labor
market,213 and an article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that
“France’s entrepreneur exodus and continued economic malaise signal the
need for a labor overhaul, not a minor adjustment.”214
Although the labor market and employment reforms enacted in June
2013 were intended to address French problems with unemployment and
declining competitiveness, the reforms fell short of implementing the kind
of change that will be needed to significantly lower France’s high rate of
unemployment, raise its levels of entrepreneurship, and revitalize the
French economy.215 After first addressing the ways in which French
employment law contributes to unemployment by harming employers and
job seekers alike, this part offers some general insights and
recommendations for the future. Finally, by examining the 2013 reforms
and focusing on specific areas where the Loi 2013-504 fell short, this part
concludes with a prescriptive analysis for how the reforms could be
improved upon to further enhance employer flexibility and reduce the cost
of entrepreneurial risk taking.
A. Achieving the Goals of Employment Protection Legislation
Although French regulations favoring open-ended contracts, rigid
211

Special Report, supra note 55.
The Loi relative à la sécurisation de l’emploi or the “Law for the Security of Employment” will
hereinafter be referred to within the text of this Note as the Loi 2013-504. Loi 2013-504 du 14 juin 2013
relative à la sécurisation de l’emploi [Law 2013-504 of June 14, 2013 Relating to the Security of
Employment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
June 16, 2013; France Enacts the Labor Law Reform Act, MORGAN LEWIS (July 3, 2013) [hereinafter
MORGAN LEWIS], http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LEPG_LF_FranceEnactmentOfLaborLawReform
Act_02july13.pdf.
213
MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
214
See, e.g., Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform: France Needs a Reagan Revolution, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform], http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB
10001424127887324235104578241292636563234; Melchiorre, supra note 139; Vranceanu, supra note 44.
215
Melchiorre, supra note 139.
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termination procedures, and mandatory employer services as firms increase
in size originate from a desire to protect employees,216 none of these
measures have proven successful at combating rising unemployment or
economic stagnation within France. In fact, the country’s workerprotective approach to employment law is harmful to both employers and
employees alike by discouraging entrepreneurial activity and preventing
job creation.217 With a general unemployment rate of nearly 11 percent of
the French population, and youth unemployment at more than 26 percent,
more than 3 million people are jobless in France.218
France’s
unemployment rate has consistently exceeded 8 percent for the last twenty
years and has hovered near the 10 percent threshold for more than a third of
the time.219 Due to France’s burdensome labor regulations and expensive
social charges, however, both small and large businesses are reluctant to
create new jobs.220
Rather than actively contributing to job creation, the legal system
actually encourages employers to engage in inefficient and informal
employment practices geared toward avoiding restrictive labor laws. For
example, France has witnessed a significant rise in “atypical precarious
forms of employment,” under which young professionals are being
engaged for increasingly long trial periods in the hopes of eventually
receiving an employment offer.221 The adverse effect of employment
protection legislation is further illustrated by indications that French
businesses are curtailing growth in order to avoid the heightened
employment regulations that result when a firm employs more than fifty
workers.222 French employment practices and the current growth crisis thus
reflects scholarly research findings that, “[i]f institutions are such that it is
beneficial for the individual to spend entrepreneurial effort on
circumventing them, the individual will do so rather than benefiting from

216

Id. (remarking that “[i]nstead of introducing needed flexibility into France’s rigid labor market,
the [reform] merely tinkers around the edges”).
217
Mark Freedland, Beyond the Public Law/Private Law Dichotomy: Employment Law, in
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 483, 487 (2d ed. 2008).
218
According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, “Onerous labor laws penalize businesses
and workers alike. Rigid labor regulations prevent employers and employees from freely negotiating
changes in terms and conditions of work, resulting often in a chronic mismatch of labor supply and
demand.” HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 91.
219
Steven Erlanger & David Jolly, French Lawmakers Loosen Labor Rules in a Victory for the
President, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/
world/europe/french-lawmakers-loosen-labor-rules.html?_r=0; Special Report, supra note 55.
220
LIBR. OF CONG.–FED. RES. DIV., supra note 200, at 18.
221
Melchiorre, supra note 139 (“Businesses don’t want to take the risk of hiring an employee they
can’t dismiss later.”); see also id. (“The unemployment and underemployment problem is often blamed
on France’s robust labor regulation and high minimum wages, which are said to inhibit job creation and
to price low-paid workers out of jobs.”); Special Report, supra note 55, at 6.
222
Gaudu, supra note 129, at 404.
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given institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance contract and product
quality.”223
Ultimately, France’s employment protection legislation not only
deters entrepreneurial activity, but also harms the very workers that it was
intended to protect by hindering job creation and blocking economic
vitality. Although the French legal system has operated in ways that
discourage entrepreneurial activity, the law can also play an important role
in fostering entrepreneurship and stimulating economic growth. In fact,
according to one scholar, in the context of the current global recession, “the
legal system may provide an additional, yet ill-understood and hence
underutilized mechanism to stimulate domestic entrepreneurship, one of the
central pillars in revitalizing economic growth.”224
B. Enhancing Employer Flexibility and Reducing the Costs of
Entrepreneurial Risk
By restricting employer flexibility and increasing the cost of
entrepreneurial risk, the rigidity of French employment law presents
significant obstacles to entrepreneurial growth. In order to undertake more
successful reform measures, French policy makers and legislators need to
recognize that entrepreneurs are self-serving agents who will only
overcome the inherent risks of investment if the legal system increases their
chances of making a return.225 Therefore, in order to make the law more
responsive to the needs of emerging businesses, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger
proposes that the law should play a dual role in encouraging
entrepreneurship by reducing the costs of entrepreneurial risk taking and
increasing the predictability of legal outcomes.226 Because entrepreneurs
face many “external risks” that are both unpredictable and beyond the
entrepreneur’s control,227 the law should serve as a tool to minimize those
risks that can be controlled.228 For example, although entrepreneurs lack
the means to singlehandedly control the economy, the law can help
entrepreneurs minimize the cost of uncontrollable “external” risks like
market fluctuations by providing them with the means to control how they
manage their workforce in response to changing economic circumstances.
223

Garicano, Lelarge & Reenen, supra note 194.
Henrekson, supra note 69.
225
Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 154.
226
See Henrekson, supra note 69 (“Individuals carrying out the entrepreneurial function are selfserving agents, so that we can reasonably assume that entrepreneurs venture into the type of
entrepreneurship that they expect will lead to the highest private return.”).
227
Mayer-Schönberger writes that the law ultimately has “two fundamental, reactive roles
associated with lowering risks for entrepreneurs: directly lowering the cost for entrepreneurial
activity . . . and increasing predictability.” Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 70, at 183.
228
Id. at 175 (“For entrepreneurs, ‘external’ risks are what they can assess, but not control. Each of
these risks consists of a cost or benefit and the probability that it will be incurred.”).
224
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Consequently, the French legal system should relax rigid hiring and
firing procedures as well as other constraints on operational flexibility in
order to provide employers with the freedom to adjust their business
models as different needs and challenges arise. Transforming France’s
heavily regulated labor market, which currently privileges workers over
employers, into a market that promotes a voluntary exchange of services
between employers and employees could help accomplish this goal,
fostering a more favorable environment for entrepreneurial investment.229
Based on the principle of voluntary exchange, French reform should
implement measures to improve labor market flexibility by eliminating
complicated dismissal requirements and empowering workers and
employers to contract freely.230
Reforms that introduce greater flexibility in the market should also
reduce the transaction costs associated with entrepreneurial risk taking. In
an article examining the impact of increased legal intervention in the field
of corporate governance, a group of scholars concluded that legal rigidity
raised transaction costs and impeded growth.231 The article observed that
“[s]tricter rules and less flexibility arguably result in higher compliance
costs and more box-ticking,” which “can have a negative spill-over effect
on the performance and development of firms.”232 As an alternative, the
authors proposed a more “flexible principle-based framework,” rather than
a detailed “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulating corporate governance.233
C. Transforming Employment Reform into an Entrepreneurial
Future
After lengthy negotiations between French trade unions and employer
trade associations, a national agreement was reached to reform French
labor and employment law on January 11, 2013.234 This agreement,
referred to as the Accord National Interprofessionnel (or the ANI), was
signed by three out of five major French trade unions and set forth the
terms for the French statutory reforms enacted in 2013 as the “Law for the
Security of Employment,” or Loi 2013-504.235 Although Loi 2013-504
229

Id. at 174–76.
HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 84, at 91 (“[T]he ability of businesses to contract freely for labor
and dismiss redundant workers when they are no longer needed is a vital mechanism for enhancing
productivity and sustaining overall economic growth. The core principle of any market is free,
voluntary exchange. That is as true in the labor market as it is in the market for goods.”).
231
Id.
232
Jose Miguel Mendoza, Christoph Van der Elst & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Entrepreneurship and
Innovation: The Hidden Costs of Corporate Governance in Europe, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 11 (2010).
233
Id. at 14.
234
Id.
235
New Labor and Employment Legislation in France—Is French Labor Law Becoming More
Flexible?, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter PROSKAUER], http://www.proskauer.com/
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implemented a number of changes to provide French employers with more
flexibility in hiring and firing practices, the reform’s effectiveness at
reshaping the French economy will be somewhat limited due to the narrow
scope of the flexibility reforms weighed against other measures to enhance
employee security.
1. Reforms Impacting Hiring Practices
The 2013 legislation provides French firms with increased flexibility
to alter their contractual relationships with employees during periods of
economic difficulty thanks to measures that facilitate employee mobility
and temporarily permit employers to cut wages and work hours.236 First, as
a result of the reform, the Code du travail now permits employers who are
not engaged in downsizing to negotiate with unions over the geographic
and occupational mobility of employees within the same company.237
Additionally, external mobility provisions that apply to firms with a
minimum of three hundred employees permit employers and employees to
temporarily suspend their employment relationship while the employee
searches for a new position in a different company.238 However, the
arrangements for external mobility may offer less flexibility to the
employer than the mobility they grant to employees. Given that the
employee can independently elect to either return to their prior position or
leave at a pre-determined date, the advantages of increased employer
flexibility are somewhat diminished by the unpredictability of the outcome
at the end of the arrangement.239 Second, under Article L5125-1 of the
Code du travail, companies that face “serious economic difficulties of a
cyclical nature,” referred to in French as graves difficultés conjoncturelles,
can negotiate agreements with the trade unions to modify collective work
arrangements to reduce employee wages and work hours for a period of up
to two years in an effort to prevent massive lay offs.240 According to an
article in the Christian Science Monitor, the critical problem with both of
these reforms is that they “only increase flexibility during economic
downturns, and they do nothing to change the employer’s fundamental and

publications/client-alert/new-labor-and-employment-legislation-in-france/.
236
France Introduces Radical Labour Market Reforms, SQUIRE SANDERS (May 2013) [hereinafter
SQUIRE SANDERS], http://www.squiresanders.com/files/Publication/5fdc90a3-c1d2-4c6a-b71d-ab4fc74
29426/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0fbce787-35f0-4c05-becd-b2a7e4620235/France-Introduces
-Radical-Labour-Market-Reforms-Newsletter.pdf; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
237
Sarah Dilorenzo, France Approves Major Labor Reform Package, YAHOO NEWS (May 14, 2013).
238
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L242-21 (Fr.).
239
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L1222-12 (Fr.).
240
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] arts. L1222-13–L1222-14 (Fr.) (“A son retour dans l’entreprise d’origine, le
salarié retrouve de plein droit son précédent emploi ou un emploi similaire, assorti d’une qualification et d’une
rémunération au moins équivalentes ainsi que du maintien à titre personnel de sa classification.”).
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burdensome obligations to employees.”241
Moreover, reform measures intended to improve employer flexibility
must also be weighed against other measures to prevent the creation of
nonpermanent jobs.242 As a result of the 2013 reform legislation, the
French statutory regime for part-time employment now requires employers
to provide part-time employees with a minimum of 24 hours of work per
week,243 subject to limited exceptions.244 Part-time employees will receive
increased compensation for any time worked in excess of their contractual
hours and the law additionally places limits on how many additional hours
they may work.245 The reforms additionally discourage the use of fixedterm contracts by increasing employers’ contribution rates to the
unemployment branch of social security based on the length of the contract
term: Employer contribution rates, which were previously capped at 4
percent, have been raised to 4.5 percent for contracts terms shorter than
three months; 5.5 percent for contract terms that last between one month
and three months; and 7 percent for contract terms of one month or less.246
The reform also raises the taxes and fees for hiring workers under
temporary contracts, which is likely to “hit[ ] businesses hard because 8 out
of every 10 new hires are on these contracts.”247 Rather than penalizing
firms for short- and part-term hiring, the Wall Street Journal observes that
“a more effective tack would be to strip away more of the costly guarantees
and protections that have made employers so wary of long-term
contracts.”248
2. Reforms Impacting Firing Practices
The 2013 reform also introduced substantial changes in dismissal
procedures for collective redundancies occurring when companies of more
than fifty employees dismiss over ten employees during a thirty-day
timeframe.249 In order to provide employers with greater firing flexibility,
Loi 2013-506 creates two different procedural tracks that simplify the

241

CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L5125-1 (Fr.).
Melchiorre, supra note 139.
243
See Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform, supra note 214.
244
CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L3123-14-1 (Fr.). See also CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art.
L3123-14 (Fr.) (listing all terms to be covered under a part-time employment contract).
245
Articles L3123-14-2 through L3123-14-5 provide lists of specific exceptions to the law
mandating part-time employees to work a minimum of twenty-four hours per week. CODE DU TRAVAIL
[C. TRAV.] arts. L3123-14-2–L3123-14-5 (Fr.).
246
French employees are to receive a 10 percent increase on their regular wages for overtime and
the law prohibits any overtime work in excess of one tenth the duration of an employee’s weekly or
monthly hours. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L3123-17 (Fr.).
247
MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
248
Melchiorre, supra note 139; Vranceanu, supra note 44.
249
Hollande’s Modest Labor Reform, supra note 214.
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implementation of collective dismissals.250 Prior to the 2013 reforms, in
the case of collective dismissals, employers were typically required to first
consult with and receive the approval of a “Works Council” regarding the
content of an employment maintenance plan and then notify and submit the
plan to the appropriate administrative authorities, all the while adhering to
a very complex set of procedures and timetables.251
As part of an “overall aim . . . to speed up the collective consultation
process,” under the 2013 reforms employers can now either negotiate an
agreement with one of the relevant trade unions, circumventing
consultations with the Work’s Council altogether,252 or unilaterally
implement a maintenance plan, which the Work’s Council must still review
but can no longer veto.253 Furthermore, regardless of which procedure
employers adopt, they are relieved from satisfying many other onerous
dismissal requirements governing meetings with employee representatives,
the timetable for the collective dismissals, and the selection criteria for
terminated employees.254 Additionally, under the reform provisions to
facilitate employee mobility and safeguard employment during periods of
economic downturn, employees who refuse to agree to these arrangements
may be terminated.255 Although employers still need to satisfy the typical
requirements for an economic dismissal, regardless of how many
terminations occur, the employers are not required to set up a maintenance
plan.256
3. Expanding the Scope of the 2013 Employment Reforms
By combining increases in job market flexibility with improved job
security for employees, the French reforms of 2013 took a moderate
approach to the “flexicurity” model of reform developed by Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands.257 Granting French companies greater
flexibility to hire and fire, it also provided roughly 3.5 million lower-wage
earners with additional employer-financed health benefits and imposed tax
penalties on French businesses using part-time and temporary employment
contracts.258
The greatest problem with the French reform measures, however, is
that they fell short of implementing the same level of substantive structural
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SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
Employment Protection, supra note 173; SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236.
SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
SQUIRE SANDERS, supra note 236; see also Employment Protection, supra note 173.
SANDERS, supra note 236; PROSKAUER, supra note 235; MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 212.
See, e.g., EUROPE’S COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 18–20; LABAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 33.
Erlanger & Jolly, supra note 219.
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reform undertaken by other “flexicurity” countries.259 First, the French
measures geared at injecting more flexibility in the labor market continued
to reflect an outmoded preference for full-time, open-ended employment
contracts, which provide increasingly little utility for both employers and
job seekers in today’s economy.260 France needs to engage in deeper
structural reforms that relax restrictive hiring practices and stay away from
the country’s age-old insistence on the CDI to facilitate the use of
temporary and part-time employment contracts. Additionally, although the
millennium has witnessed growing trends across OECD member countries
in favor of implementing reforms that facilitate the use of fixed-term and
temporary employment contracts, France and Italy were two of the main
exceptions to these trends toward the liberalization of employment
protection legislation.261
Second, despite measures to facilitate dismissal procedures, the
French reforms failed to remove one of the most significant obstacles to
employer flexibility under the Code du travail. Onerous termination
procedures still require French companies to justify their financial
difficulty before they can restructure their workforce and dismiss redundant
employees.262 The law only permits firms to use the new streamlined
dismissal procedures to help preserve the competitiveness of companies
that are already in difficulty, and “firms still cannot lay off workers to
improve competitiveness when the business is healthy.”263 The 2013
reforms, therefore, only go half way at providing the greater firing
flexibility France needs in order to incentivize employers and entrepreneurs
to resume hiring.264
Overall, the French reforms placed too great an emphasis on security
measures in a country that already offers extensive social security benefits,
as well as other social services that are experiencing increasing pressure in
light of France’s current rates of job creation.265 Although improved
security measures, such as enhanced unemployment benefits, job search
assistance, and professional development training are a critical feature of
the “flexicurity” model,266 France has a more pressing need to increase job
market flexibility in order to stimulate job creation and entrepreneurial
activity during a period of declining competitiveness. According to a
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report on French employment prepared by McKinsey Global Institute,
“France needs to more than double the number of net new jobs it creates
each year to meet ambitions for employment and prosperity at a par with
the European average.”267 France should look more to countries like
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands for a successful example to
emulate in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The absence of a business environment or legal regime that rewards
entrepreneurial investment is at the heart of France’s performance gap and
declining competitiveness. Along with a detailed discussion of the ways in
which French employment law impedes entrepreneurial activity and
unintentionally harms employees in the process, this Note confirms the
observation that, “[b]y substituting political judgments for those of the
marketplace, government diverts entrepreneurial resources and energy from
productive activities to rent-seeking . . . . The result is lower productivity,
economic stagnation, and declining prosperity.”268 This Note therefore
concludes that by reforming France’s rigid employment laws through
deregulation measures that enhance employer flexibility and reduce the
costs of forming new businesses, the French state can remove barriers to
entrepreneurial activity and stimulate economic growth.
As the French economy continues to suffer from high rates of
unemployment and economic stagnation, there has been increasing
international unease regarding the vitality of the country’s economic future.
Before France finds itself on the brink of another recession, now is the
ideal moment for policymakers to send a positive signal to France’s private
business sector and the international community by undertaking key
employment reforms that promote entrepreneurship and create jobs. In
particular, French employment law can be improved by increasing the
hiring and firing flexibility of employers in running their businesses,
encouraging the voluntary exchange of services between workers and
employers, and adapting the law to the entrepreneur’s needs by decreasing
the costs of risk and increasing the predictability of legal outcomes. By
reforming employment laws to remove regulations and even create
incentives for entrepreneurial activity, significant potential exists for a
country like France to revitalize a depressed economy and generate positive
growth.
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